The goal of this paper is to specify the nature of the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) as a non-state armed organisation and to make sense of its shaky existence since its inception, almost three years ago, with a particular focus on the period that made the MNJ a serious political and military opponent to the government. Our argument is that circumstantial alliances and percolation of grievances provoked by local micro-political dynamics and long-standing disenfranchisement of some sections of the Tuareg youth permitted the movement to take off as a credible rebel group. Ultimately, we want to verify if existing analytical tools made available by the theoretical literature on non-state armed groups are adequate to make sense of the MNJ's organisational trajectory, particularly considering Jeremy Weinstein's seminal book "Inside Rebellion" (Weinstein, 2006) . By putting too much emphasis on "initial conditions", Weinstein's model, we argue, fails to properly acknowledge the micro-social dynamics that shape armed groups and their erratic trajectory, and we stress the need to investigate what armed organizations are sociologically made of rather than bluntly postulating their existence.
Introduction
On 9 February 2007, the military post of Iferouane, a northern locality of Niger was attacked by a handful of armed men on board of five pick-ups. Three soldiers of the Forces armées nigeriennes (FAN) were killed and some military material was robbed. Although of unusual gravity, the attack could have been considered as another isolated act of "residual banditry", as Niger's authorities used to label any pseudo-criminal act perpetrated in the North by suspected ex-rebels since the low-intensity insurrection that opposed Tuareg armed groups to governmental forces officially ended in the mid-90s.
Indeed, two of the men that were involved in the attack of Iferouane, known as ex-combatants, had also the reputation of being irreducible traffickers operating in the loosely controlled desert zone between Niger, Mali, Algeria, and Libya. But unexpectedly, a group unknown so far, the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) soon claimed the attack and almost simultaneously made accessible to the rest of the world a platform of substantial political claims and pursued a fine-tuned propaganda through an internet blog, updated on a daily basis 2 .
According to its founders, political and economic marginalisation of the northern populations, unequal and opaque distribution of the uranium rent -exploited in the northern mining town Arlit (see figure 1 in the appendix) -were the two main reasons why the MNJ was born.
A few months later, the MNJ gathered more than 1,000 combatants, mostly concentrated in the Aïr Mountains around Tamgak (see figure 1 ). From this stronghold, the rebels proved capable of hitting any location of the vast northern Niger desert territory. In parallel, the international media exposure of the MNJ progressively mounted, notably in France, the former colonial power. It In sum, what started as an obscure isolated attack only temporarily mutated into a credible armed rebellion with a solid political content and later on unraveled into a hardly intelligible mosaic of seemingly separate groups. In fact the oddity here is not the way the movement started nor is it the way it ended: as mentioned above, 'residual banditry' perpetrated by ex-combatants was commonplace in the area for years while Libya's role in accommodating (or inflaming) tensions is another recurrent feature of local politics. The unusual event here is actually the ideological depth and credibility that the rebel movement temporarily showed.
Our goal is to specify the nature of the MNJ as a non-state armed organisation and to make sense of its shaky existence since its inception, almost three years ago, with a particular focus on the period that made the MNJ a serious political and military opponent to the government. Our argument is that circumstantial alliances and percolation of grievances provoked by local micro-political dynamic and long-standing disenfranchisement of some sections of the Tuareg youth permitted the movement to take off as a credible rebel group. Ultimately, we want to verify if existing analytical tools made available by the theoretical literature on non-state armed groups are adequate to make sense of the MNJ's organisational trajectory.
Categorising rebellions, accounting for armed groups' organisational dynamic
Jeremy Weinstein has recently produced a seminal book -"Inside Rebellion" (Weinstein, 2006) - Hence what characterises rebellion making according to Weinstein is a top-down, demand-driven logic determined by finance constraints, mimicking a firm's recruitment policy. As a general approach, applying the firm model to rebellion-making raises some problems. Trivialising political engagement into a narrow economicist framework might be one. We will however concentrate our critique on one aspect of Weinstein's analytical framework, namely the idea that the nature of an armed group can be determined ex ante by structural constraints. Weinstein's perspective conceives armed rebellion as a 'plan' unfolding according to a script which is encapsulated in the 'initial conditions' that surround the rebellion making project. Since the type of rebellion that will finally emerge is structurally determined by access to finance, the profiles of the recruits can be known before any actual recruitment takes place. According to Weinstein, recruitment is not a process through which rebel leaders' expectations on their labour force are matched together with the hopes that applicants place in their engagement in violence.
Contrarily, recruitment follows the logic of self-selection: those who join have the characteristics required by the structural constraints imposed from the start.
We argue that viewing rebellion as a 'planned action' (Thévenot, 1995) When establishing the administrative structures of the colony, France promoted to offices an educated elite mostly coming from the South of Niger and, particularly, from the Djerma and Songhay ethnic groups 4 . This bias partly stems from the Tuareg communities' reluctance to send of negotiations conducted under the auspices of Libya, Algeria's regional political competitor. Actually, one can hypothesise several reasons behind Algeria's tolerance towards MNJ combatants: first Algeria wants to avoid political instability to spread among its own Tuareg communities in the Hoggar (around Tamanrasset) and the Tassili (around Djanet); second, Algeria needs the support of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger to fight the Islamistsnow re-branded Al-Qaeda Maghreb (AQMI) -causing political disorder in the region. Finally, there's a more mundane reason: some Algerian military in the zone and the Tuaregs may have common economic interests in the highly profitable cross-border business happening in this region (subsidised food, cigarettes from Nigeria, electronic appliances, drug, arms and illegal migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). 4 An illuminating point of view on Niger's ethnic groups' alleged psychological traits and their usefulness for the colony is provided by the French colonial officer Maurice Abadie in 1927: "the Djermas are the most intelligent and the most active population in the whole Sudan [a colonial territory corresponding to today's Mali]; they provide very good tirailleurs, the best of the colony" (Abadie, 1927, p. 116-117) . In sharp contrast, the Tuaregs are presented as a their children from noble casts to school (Rasmussen, 1992) This political destitution was paralleled by a rapid economic decline. The livestock of Tuareg herdsmen was dramatically downsized following Kaocen's military defeat (Triaud, 1993) and was hit again by major droughts in the 70s and the 80s. Long-distance trans-Saharan trade progressively became obsolete due to the opening of new commercial routes (by air or boat from the Gulf of Guinea coastal metropolis, see Brachet (2004) and Grégoire (2001) In the new economic climate, blacksmiths as well as slaves had a relatively greater disposition to adapt to sedentary activities such as artisanship or gardening and sometimes became economically better off than their former masters.
Another major consequence of economic deprivation was the migration of many youths of Tuareg origin in cities of neighbouring countries, Algeria or Libya (Tamanrasset, Ghat, Sabha...).
In Libya particularly, some of them benefited from the hospitality of Col. Ghaddafi at a time when his country was supporting many liberation movements on the African continent (Chad) and beyond (Lebanon). Disgruntled Tuareg youths became a welcome labour force in Ghaddafi's much less obeying people and their martial ethos is stressed: they are "always armed" and "force is ultimately the only argument capable of safeguarding peace and keeping the Tuaregs on the right track" (Abadie, 1927, p. 169) . 5 The rest of the population is distributed among Fulanis, Kanuris, Arabs, Tubus or Gourmantchés.
Islamic Legion where they received military training and contributed to military actions in various war theaters. They also performed urban activities unknown to most Tuaregs so far or participated in cross-border smuggling of cigarettes or Algerian subsidized goods, taking advantage of the price difference between Algeria and Mali and Niger and using their deep knowledge of the desert to escape Algerian or Nigérien borders control 6 (Ag Ahar, 1990 ). Many of them remained under-employed which earned them the label ishumar (after the French word chômeur, i.e. unemployed). Rejecting total cultural alienation, Tuareg migrants of the teshumara movement (i.e. the identity created abroad by the ishumar) elaborated an egalitarian, revolutionary form of nationalism, spread across the desert through the songs of activist musicians, the most famous of them being the Malian collective Tinariwen ('deserts') 7 which explicitly and powerfully advocated armed rebellion (Belalimat, 2003; Lecocq, 2004) .
Ideologically converted to insurgency and militarily trained by Libya, the ishumar were the revengeful vanguard of the rebel movements that formed in the late 80s.
In The rebel project, envisaged before the Tchintabaraden massacres (Casajus, 1995) unraveled into a confusing subdivision of fronts organised around clanic and geographic proximities with no major ideological divergence between them (see figure 2 in the appendix).
Each front being entitled access to post-conflict benefits as a peace negotiator, the structural incentive to factionalise increased.
In early 1994, the fronts built up a new entity, the Coordination de la Résistance Armée (CRA) and re-structured their claims, to be voiced during official peace negotiations in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, under Algerian auspices. In April 1995, an Agreement was issued which followed three main directions: decentralization of state's prerogatives to municipalities (communes)
instead of autonomy of regions in a federal system as originally demanded by the insurgents; economic development in the North, and integration and access to jobs of combatants 8 . Other agreements concerned the personal fate of rebel leaders: the latter were most probably offered some substantial cash transfers. In 1997, the last front still operating, led by Mohamed Anacko, joined the peace process. Ironically, Mohamed Anacko is now the Haut Commissaire à la Restauration de la Paix in which capacity he is currently promoting dialogue with the ongoing rebellion on behalf of the President Mamadou Tandja. Rhissa ag Boula was offered a position of
Minister of Tourism which he held during seven years following the peace accords. Tourism is a strategic income-generating activity in the North and a sector entirely controlled by the Tuaregs.
By being granted this mandate, Rhissa Boula was also implicitly given discretionary powers to prevent any insurrectional aspiration to resume in the Agadez region and, one may argue, to keep an eye on cross-border trade: when not used to carry tourists, one obvious way to make fourwheel drive cars profitable is to use them for smuggling 9 .
Historically entrenched reasons for discontent among the Tuaregs have been numerous and multidimensional: economic, political and social. Tuareg migrants experimenting exile in Algeria and Libya -where they also acquired military competence -constituted the frontrunners of a revolutionary project that unfolded in the 90s. As we will now see, today's insurgency can Rhissa ag Boula, sacked from the government and imprisoned after the killing of a local political figure, a murder he was accused of being involved in. The FLAA was then re-formed temporarily to serve the interests of its chief. Indeed, Rhissa ag Boula was soon freed and, in 9 The Sahara is a very loosely monitored zone of cross-border trafficking. Cross-border trade is necessary to the subsistence of local communities as it is mostly composed (in terms of volume) of basic livelihoods, to which gas or cigarettes should be added. Highly profitable illegal trade of illicit commodities (cannabis, arms) is also pervasive in which Tuaregs play a determinant role as conveyors and drivers (Brachet, 2007) Obtaining the promised financial assistance, getting secure positions and promotions in security forces -preferably in a military body mostly composed of Tuaregs -to permit the control of the 10 Inter family gory disputes are also said to have fuelled division between the ag Boula clan and the Alambos. One should note that ag Boulas and Alambos are both Kel Tadele, a sub-group of the Kel Aïr, i.e. the pastoralist Tuareg groups originating from the Aïr mountains, north of Agadez and near the Algerian border. These disputes might have to do with Rhissa ag Boula using his position as a Minister to police the Aïr underground economy, partly based on smuggling, for his own benefit. In 2005, once liberated thanks to his brother's hostage-taking action, Rhissa Boula took over the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès social (UDPS), the dominant "Tuareg" political party, in another attempt to maintain his hold on the region and pursue a political career. The Iferouane attack definitely caught Rhissa Boula by surprise and constituted a blow to his leadership among the Tuaregs. To these first-movers, the MNJ appeared to be the right place from which some access to security-related state's rents could be demanded and extorted.
These alliances however show a high degree of instability -as the Weinstein's approach of opportunism-driven rebellion would predict: the Jeunesses Arabes surrendered to governmental forces only a few months after rallying the insurgency. The MNJ argued that they were actually sacked and accused them to free-ride, i.e. to carry out trafficking for private purposes under the umbrella of the rebellion. In early 2009, Kindo Zada disappeared after he was dismissed from the MNJ for suspicion of intelligence activities for the government. He rallied very recently the FPN, the MNJ splinter group that first decided to lay down arms, through a communiqué sent from N'djamena, Chad -certainly to show his good inclination toward peace 11 .
Certainly the biggest blow to the MNJ's cohesion was the creation, in March 2008, of a dissident Tuareg front, the Front des forces de redressement 12 , whose sole purpose was to permit a return of Rhissa ag Boula to the front stage. As an ex-chief of the rebellion, Rhissa ag Boula could not reasonably pledge allegiance to his former military subordinates while the inglorious episode of his liberation from jail following the hostage-taking action led by his brother alienated him from governmental support. Creating his own front was then the sole tractable option Rhissa ag Boula had to salvage his political existence. By doing so he seriously undermined the MNJ's capacity to speak with one voice.
The strong personalities and their armed affiliates that composed the multiple commanding heads of the MNJ certainly do not share any mechanical sense of solidarity. Their behaviours are guided by shifting instrumental loyalties, a phenomenon observed elsewhere in the region (see Debos, 2008, on Chad) . These groups have heterogenous objectives and time horizons and, punctually, decide to act together 13 . They share some features with Hobsbawm's seminal 'social bandits': they are not anti-social criminals; they do indeed constitute one dimension of social order as extra-legal actors and might contest the authorities violently if they feel they have been treated unjustly; they then attempt to "right the wrongs". They are the ones, within a community, brave enough "to say no". Their political agenda generally does not go beyond this assertion of opposition 14 (Hobsbawm, 2000) .
Importantly however, this characterisation of the MNJ as a complex of outlaws does not apply so systematically to its later developments.
Building political legitimacy with the help of international expertise
Two major developments intervened soon after the Iferouane attack: Aghaly Alambo (Boubacar's brother) was asked to lead the movement and a political platform was issued which formed the basis of political debate and activism beyond Niger's boundary and, particularly in 14 One may add two other features of social bandits, as described by Hobsbawm, which may apply to our case. Hobsbawm stresses that social bandits are sociologically more likely to be found in pastoralist or herdsmen societies. Most of the Tuareg leaders of the 2007 rebellion actually originate from the Aïr Mountains where pastoral activities are still central to the economy. Another interesting trait of the social bandits evoked by Hobsbawm concerns the popularity (mixed with fear) they enjoy among the population and the grand narratives that generally describe their feats. Interestingly the most detailed and, strikingly, uninterrupted account we heard during our interviews was the epic story that forced Boubacar Alambo to desert the army and become an outlaw: when still a military, he had lent his arm to a friend willing to go hunting but the friend did not return the gun. This would mean severe punishment for Alambo which is why he decided to collect the gun instead of going back to the barracks. He was then considered as a deserter and got chased by the security forces, but cleverly escaped in the mountains, took some hostages there, managed to gain temporary impunity etc. One should not overlook that the many events aiming at attracting media attention also constituted occasions to raise funds for the Tuareg populations of the Aïr and, most probably, for the MNJ combatants themselves. Important efforts were also devoted to alert local populations in Niger: digitalised material informing on uranium exploitation and its current and prospective effects on public health, land ownership etc. was prepared from Paris and sent to Niger to be circulated among combatants and the population on memory sticks. Figure 3 in the appendix is the most glaring example of these efforts. Incidentally, this shows, contrarily to Weinstein's argument, that external material sponsorship and ideological advocacy can actually go hand in hand.
Our point here is not to overlook the objective problems caused by uranium extraction in Niger.
Uranium exploitation does pose serious problems to Niger: after decades of opaque management 
"Joining Tamgak", the liberating experience of the ishumar
In addition to disgruntled professionals of arms seeking privileges and to activists of the diaspora striving to instil political content in the movement, the MNJ is composed of at least one more stratum of militants: the so-called ishumar, generally enlisted as rank-and-file. We met some of them in Tamanrasset open rejection of their Tuareg identity by the teachers or non-Tuareg classmates. These discriminatory behaviours were perpetuated after school when these young men sought jobs and tried to pass interviews or exams: I was told countless episodes of candidates "not known by anyone", "not born in Agadez", "not brought up among us", and, importantly, "not more qualified than we are" finally being granted the job they were coveting.
The feeling of injustice is reinforced by the fact that MNJ combatants consider the northern region as their own. This does not just express sentimental attachment. As stressed above, Tuaregs have plenty of very practical competences intimately linked to their life in the desert 19 What gave particular resonance to this event was also the fact that one of the victims was Kalakoua's father. 20 See S. N. Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) for an interpretative framework linking enlistment of combatants and state repression. 21 None of the dozens of exploration permits granted by Niger to foreign multinational corporations has concretised yet, except one, the Imouraren project which will be, in the next 2 years, the second largest uranium mine in the world, thanks to €1bn investment. They form a small all-male cell of solidarity ties and a space for political debate which tends to be self-validating. The music they listen to describes their daily misery, glorifies the desert, celebrates friendship ties and urges them to stand up 23 . The stigma of being unemployed has somehow been transformed into a pride. Crucially, our point is that the teshumara represents an alternative lifestyle which is very adequate for warlike purposes 24 .
What does "going to Tamgak" or "exiting" (sortir) mean in this context? We suggest that it implies the extension of the teshumara lifestyle at a full scale with the additional satisfaction that one, at least in theory, contributes to political change. By enlisting, ishumar make something collectively useful: "we assert our culture and we make it advance at the same time". on was the joy of joining their Agadez friends -sometimes after days of lonely walk in the desert -and the liberating experience that being in Tamgak represented for them. Rebelling is not just about obtaining more from central authorities (political representation, jobs, access to uranium rents), it is also about promoting a different social model, which draws on a revisited Tuareg identity.
Joining and staying for a while in Tamgak is about "learning", "living an adventure" much more than obeying orders and being under the command of military chiefs. Discipline in Tamgak is pretty loose. Formally, new recruits seal their loyalty to the group by swearing on the Quran 25 ;
then their military abilities are tested. They receive a military rank but the gesture is "more a public display of respect than a real military rank". The fighting community, like the urban collective of ishumar is seen as an egalitarian group: rewards are banned because -as I was told -"a reward is a division". Importantly, this point should be mitigated by the fact that arms are selectively distributed to combatants, on the basis of 'merits'.
Defecting is permitted and not necessarily associated with the betrayal of the cause. Intelligence with the enemy may be suspected but "if you betray us, that's a problem between you and your consciousness" 26 . The leadership is respected but not blindly worshipped. The fact that some of the leaders might have opportunistic agendas is fully acknowledged but this does not cast a shadow of doubt on the ishumars' own motives to enlist as decisions are primarily the outcome of individuals' internal deliberations: "everybody has to do his own revolution"; "the leaders just did the first step".
According to the Tamanrasset militants' accounts, the MNJ looks like a 'hop on -hop off' rebellion loosely controlled by their chiefs. The interviewees might have exaggerated the role their agency played in the process of enlistment they reported to me. Yet their detailed personal stories do show a high degree of reflexivity and stress that no one, except a few friends (i.e.
chosen social relations), needed to be consulted to decide whether or not to join. In addition, the military structure they describe hardly resembles the neat hierarchical outfit that an "industrial organization of violence" would suggest.
Conclusion: the MNJ as the temporary coalescence of heterogeneous sectional interests
The empirical evidence exposed above shows the intrinsic ambivalence of the MNJ as an armed group. The first-movers, composed of opportunistic professionals of violence, have been joined by politicized activists giving advice from abroad and youths carrying out their "own revolution"
and deeply moved by a revisited 'Tuareg' ethos encapsulated in the teshumara movement. The activists of the Diaspora gained prominence several months after the movement started and, as intellectuals, are favorably positioned to lead peace negotiations with the government, under the control of those who still detain arms. Some ishumar may gain modest material advantages and resume their lives as before. These heterogeneous groups only temporarily united their forces, forming an organizational complex that hardly resembled a neat military structure.
Where to situate the MNJ in Weinstein's typology hence seems quite undecidable. Blatantly, Source: (Tchinaghen, 2008) , p. 9; Ministère des Mines et de l'Energie du Niger
